These vulnerabilities emerge from a tendency of liberals – identified by the father of modern realism, E. It is perhaps in the perceived strength of the liberal narrative – of peace through the rule of law, democracy, and free trade – that the problem lies: this strength may very well have turned into arrogance as it blinded Western policymakers to their guiding ideological framework’s inherent deficiencies – deficiencies that any illiberal power would be poised to exploit. This calls for a move beyond the purely reactive, an examination of possible or actual responses to the gradual subversion of the status-quo by illiberal powers, towards an exploration of the weak and blind spots which have, over time, built up to allow for such subversion. In such a world, it is perhaps time to critically examine how such a powerful narrative, one laying claim to moral superiority for much of the 20 th century, came to be weakened to such an extent as to now be firmly on the back foot. In China’s case, pushback has been more disjointed and haphazard: in fact, a large but shrinking contingent of analysts still expect Beijing to operate within the mostly liberal rules-based order largely shaped by Western hegemony in previous decades, a leap of faith that is becoming increasingly imprudent in an increasingly disorderly world. Responses to illiberal powers have been, at best, fragmented, inconsistent and, therefore, highly ineffective. While NATO’s capacities have been strengthened, economic sanctions have not led to a change in Russian behaviour regarding electoral and political interference, or a reduction in energy dependency on Moscow. ![]() ![]() Others have doubled down on the notion that only the three elements of what Russett and Oneal have referred to as the ‘tripod of the liberal peace’ – international law, democracy, and free trade – can provide peace and prosperity in this century. Some – including the present US administration – have retreated into an incoherent combination of aggressive foreign-policy posturing, nativist ideology, and protectionism. The West, meanwhile, has been thrown into disarray, in what is its greatest existential crisis since World War Two. ![]() Beijing is effectively challenging what was once the de-facto Western system-shaping prerogative through ostensibly economic but intensely geopolitical initiatives like ‘One Belt, One Road’ and against the earlier Western hopes that prosperity would engender political liberalisation, the People’s Republic is inexorably moving in a 21 st-century Orwellian direction. Meanwhile, under Xi Jinping, China’s policies have become ever-more assertive externally, and authoritarian internally. For one, the Kremlin now actively undermines the liberal post-Cold War order in Europe, and beyond it subverts democracy, at home, and abroad – including in the West and it sees ‘free markets’ primarily as a power-political tool – as clearly apparent in its treatment of natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, as much as a strategic asset as a commodity. Can small-l liberalism survive in an ever-more illiberal world? This question is becoming progressively more acute, as the liberal ‘core’ is challenged by illiberal powers – like Russia and China – whose relative power has been growing since the turn of the century.
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